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TORT LIABILITY OF INSURER FOR FAILURE TO ACT
PROMPTLY ON APPLICATION
Plaintiffs applied for policies of life insurance for three child-
ren and paid the first premiums. Policies were issued on two of
the infants but the third was held up because the agent had failed
to supply sufficient information and the third infant later died.
Plaintiffs brought action in tort against the insurer for the negli-
gence of the agent. Held, delay in the issuance of a life insurance
policy caused by the agent's negligence does not ground a cause
of action in tort against the insurance company. Chittum v.
(ommonwealtL Life Insurance Company.'
It is a well-settled rule that no contract of insurance is created
by the failure of an insurer to reject an application for a policy
within a reasonable time.2 Nevertheless, a few courts have held
that silence on the part of the insurer constitutes an acceptance.'
Other courts have found that the delivery of the policy by the
home office to the office of the local agent is a constructive accept-
ance.4 The position taken by these courts is opposed to the weight
of authority and is difficult to maintain. But they do show an
inclination on the part of the courts to give some remedy to dis-
app6inted applicants and they demonstrate that the courts would
readily give a remedy if they could find some sound legal theory
1177 S. E. 782 (W. Va. 1934).
2 Walker v. Farmers Insurance Co., 51 Iowa 679 (1879); Ross v. New York
Life Insurance Co., 124 N. C. 395, 32 S. E. 733 (1899); Royal Insurance Co.
v. Beatty, 119 Pa. 6, 12 AtI. 607 (1888); Northern Neck Mutual Fire In-
surance Ass'n v. Turlington, 135 Va. 44, 116 S. E. 363 (1923); Giddings v.
Insurance Co., 102 U. S. 108, 26 L. Ed. 92 (1880); VANCE, IxSURANCE (2d
ed. 1930) 188; 1 CooLEY, BRIEFS ON INSUR&wCE (2d ed. 1927) 533-537, 595-
599 and cases cited.
a Preferred Accident Insurance Co. v. Stone, 61 Kan. 48, 58 Pac. 986
(1899); Richmond v. Travelers' Insurance Co., 123 Tenn. 307, 130 S. W. 790
(1910).
4 Rose v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 240 Ill. 45, 88 N. P,. 204 (1909);
Paine v. Pacific Mutual Insurance Co., 51 Fed. 689 (C. C. A. 8th, 1905);
Bowman v. Northern Accident Insurance Co., 124 Mo. App. 477, 101 S. W.
691 (1907); Williams v. Atlas Ass'n Co., 22 Ga. App. 661, 97 S. E. 91 (1918).
The cases permitting recovery on the contract are based on the theory that the
delay of the insurance company prevents the securing of insurance elsewhere
and creates a legal presumption of acceptance. This has been permitted only
where the premium has been paid in advance and the loss has occurred before
notification. It is necessary that the insured person have been as acceptable
risk and the only cause of the failure to issue the policy has been the delay on
the part of the insirer.
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upon which to base their decisions. The West Virginia court has
long followed the weight of authority on this point.
Many recent cases have upheld a right of recovery in an
action of tort against insurers, on the ground of negligence in fail-
ing to act upon an application, and there was a subsequent loss
not covered by insurance. 6 This doctrine of tort liability is a
rather recent development in the field of insurance law. It was
first enunciated in Hawaii in 18977 and appeared in the United
States in 1912.8 These decisions and the ones following them have
been characterized as "ill considered, newfangled and unjust"'
and as "interesting and rather surprising". 1 After the intro-
duction of the theory the courts seized upon it as a method of im-
posing liability upon insurers, giving a number of explanations of
the basis of the duty of the insurer promptly to accept or reject
applications for insurance. An examination of the many cases
permitting recoverr shows that they may be placed in three class-
ifications. There are some cases relying on each of the theories
advanced but in the majority of the cases niention of two or more
of them in the opinion.
1. Contract theory. There is a large group of cases which
contain statements suggesting that the duty arises from a contract
implied either in fact or in law to accept or reject the application
promptly, in consideration of the advance payment11 of the prem-
5 McCully's Adm'r v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co., 18 W. Va. 782(1881), wherein the court held: "An application for insurance is a mere pro-
posal, which the company can accept, reject or modify, and until the minds of
the parties meet by agreement upon all the terms, and all the conditions, Ye-
quired are performed, no contract arises ..... .a contract cannot bind
the party proposing it, until the acceptance of the other party is in some
way actually or constructively communicated to it."
6 Duffie v. Bankers' Life Ass'n, 160 Iowa 19, 139 N. W. 1087, 46 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 25 (1913); Boyer v. State Farmers' Mutual Hail Insurance Co., 86
Rans. 442, 121 Pac. 329, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) (1912) ; Security Insurance Co.
v. Cameron, 85 Okla. 171, 205 Pac. 151, 27 A. L. R. 444 (1922). For complete
list of cases see further, Notes (1920) 15 A. L. R. 1026 and (1931) 75 A.
L. R. 952.
r Carter v. Manhattan Life Insurance Co., 11 Hawaii 69 (1897).
S Boyer v. Farmers' Mutual Hail Insurance Co., supra n. 6. This case
reached an independent result without reference to the Hawaiian case.
9 Grossman, Tort or No Tort (1929) 56 CH. L. N. 366.
10 VANCE, op. cit. supra n. 1, at 190.
11 Kukuska v. Home Mutual Insurance Company, 204 Wis. 166, 235 N. W.
403 (1931); fDe Ford v. New York Life Insurance Co., 75 Colo. 146, 224 Pac.
1049 (1924); Strand v. Bankers' Life Insurance Co., 115 Neb. 357, 213 N.
W. 349 (1927); American Fire Insurance Co. v. Nabors, 48 S. W. (2d) 459,
463 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
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ium. Others have found the consideration in the applicant's dis-
abling himself from applying elsewhere'2 for insurance during the
waiting period, or of submitting to the physical examination. In
other words, silence, long continued, gives consent.1
3
2. Tort theory. In this group of cases the courts point out
that the delay in acting upon an application subjects the applicant
to unnecessary danger of loss and holds that guided by the con-
siderations which ordinarily regulate conduct, a reasonable man
would have acted with diligence.'" Only a few cases have gone so
far'15 as to base the liability solely upon so general a principle but
they tend to illustrate the view that an insurance contract must
be considered in all its parts as different from the ordinary con-
tract.
3. Public Utility theory. This theory originated in the case
of Duffie v. Banker's Life Ass'n,8 where the duty to act promptly
was based chiefly on the fact that the state had chartered the in-
surance company and in furtherance of a legislative policy that
all who are eligible and desire it should have an opportunity to
purchase insurance.17  The insurance business has been held to
be impressed with a public interest and thus different from, and
subject to, a greater degree of regulation than ordinary business. 8
Discrimination in rates has been prohibited" and the company's
freedom of contract has been abridged by statutes curtailing its
privilege of inserting stipulations against fraud. 0  There is a
12 Strand v. Bankers' Life Insurance Co., upra n. 11. *
.3 Carter v. Manhattan Life Insurance Co., supra n. 7 (b~sed on sub-
mission to physical examination). Some courts have stated that "(the
action is founded on contract though nominally laid in tort." Columbian Na-
tional Life Insurance Co. v. Lemmons, 96 Okia. 228, 222 Pac. 255 (1923).
14 Boyer v. State Farmers' Mutual Hail Insurance Company, supra n. 6.
2r Wallace v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company, 31 Idaho 481, 174 Pac.
1009 (1918); Wilkin v. Capitol Fire Insurance Co., 99 Neb. 828, 157 N. W.
1021 (1916).
1 160 Iowa 19, 139 N. W. 1087 (1913). While the insurance company has
an absolute right to accept or reject it must do so within' a reasonable time.
Strand v. Bankers' Life Insurance Co., supra n. 11.
17 De Ford v. New York Life Insurance Co., supra n. 11; Security Insurance
Co. v. Cameron, supra n. 6.
18 German AlIiance Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389, 34 S. Ct. 612
(1914).
19 Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Commonwealth, 113 Ky. 126, 67 S.
W. 388 (1902).
20 Northwestern Life Insurance Company v. Riggs, 203 U. S. 243, 27 S. Ct.
126 (1906) (or suicide); Whitfield v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 205 U. S.
489 (1907); Head Camp Woodmen of the World v. Sloss, 49 Colo. 177, 112
Pac. 49 (1910).
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constantly increasing movement to shift the burden of loss due to
accident from the individual to the community and while this is
usually done by the legislature, as in the case of Workmen's Com-
pensation laws, the courts are inclined to further it through the
common law.21
In cases like the present one where the delay is caused by the
local agent the principal should be liable under the doctrine of
respondeat superior.2 2  Once the duty of the principal to act
promptly is established the courts have had no difficulty in finding
the same duty when the agent was responsible for the delay.2
The weight as well as the wave of authority is in favor of
granting relief in tort actions in this type of case whether the
action is based on negligent conduct or upon the breach of a duty
imposed by law. The social desirability of ameloriating the situa-
tion of unfortunate individuals by the law of probability which is
evident in many fields of activity should cause the courts to exact
of insurers a responsibility for efficient action far greater than is
required in the ordinary business enterprise. There must also be
considered the peculiar status of the insurer and the applicant,
the insurance contract being one of adhesion,"-4 which is treated in
a way different from an ordinary agreement. These important
considerations seem to have been ignored in the decision of the
principal case. The court considered itself bound by the dictum
of a prior case which rejected the theory largely on the ground
that it was an innovation in the law. 25 Accordingly the present
decision seems regrettable.2"
Since the applicant injured by the delay can recover in
neither contract nor tort in West Virginia it is suggested that the
21 Dyer v. Missouri State Life Insurance Co., 132 Wash. 378, 232 Pac. 1049
(1925).
22 Royal Neighbors v. Fartenberry, 214 Ala. 387, 107 So. 840 (1926) ; Wal-
lace v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 31 Idaho 481, 124 Pac. 1009 (1918);
'Wlkin v. Capitol Firb Insurance Co., supra n. 15; Fox v. Insurance Co., 185
N. C. 121, 116 S. B. 266 (1923).
23 Fox v. Insurance Co., upra n. 22.
2 4 
VANCE, op. cit. supra n. 1 at 201. As such it differs from the ordinary
contract between individuals where both parties have the same opportunities
for negotiation.
25 Thornton v. Order of Mechanics, 110 W. Va. 412, 158 S. E. 507, 509
(1931).
2a8 It is doubtful if any court would deny recovery in tort for the non-
feasance of a railroad company if a shipment were presented with payment
and all requirements were complied with and the railroad did nothing for an
unreasonable time causing loss to the shipper.
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legislature should enact a statute declaring that unreasonable de-
lay would give rise to tort liability for damages to the amount of
the face value of the policy applied for, or that the insurer would
be bound by the contract unless it notified the applicant within
a specified time. Support for the constitutionality of the statute
might be drawn from a decision of the Federal Supreme Court sus-
taining a somewhat similar enactment, relating to certain kinds of
crop insurance, as a valid exercise of the police power.2 7
-R. DoYE HALBRITTER.
2T Wanberg v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., 46 N. D. 369, 179 N. W.
666 (1920) construing § 4902 of N. D. ComP. LAws ANx. (Supp. 1925) (must
pass on hail insurance application within 24 hours), affirmed in National Union
Fire Insurance Co. v. Wanberg, 260 U. S. 71, 41 S. Ct. 72 (1922).
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